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During 2006, AAL adopted and implemented its first share repurchase program, which continued 
up until its suspension in 2008. While management stated that share repurchases would only be 
done in the interest of shareholders, the repurchase program was disastrous for shareholder 
value. Management also stated that share repurchases provide the firm with flexibility regarding 
its capital structure. 
We investigated the capital structure of AAL for the years 2004 to 2012 from an optimal capital 
structure perspective. Using a CAPM approach, we find no evidence that AAL targeted or 








Due to the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, it is of interest to determine whether the fall in 
share price recorded by Anglo American plc (“AAL”) is due to the general decline of the market, 
or due to some other reason specific to AAL. While there can be no doubt that the financial crisis 
and the resultant market deterioration had a detrimental effect on all stocks, including AAL, the 
question is whether AAL was less or more affected than average (i.e. than the market decline)? 
Did investors, in the face of the financial crisis, view AAL more or less favourably to other stocks? 
In an attempt to answer this question, we compare the stock price performance of AAL to that of 
BHP Billiton Ltd (“BHP”) and the S&P 500 index (“SPX”). 
From the period January 2001 to December 2007, AAL recorded share price growth of 330.35% 
in USD terms. This is compared to BHP and SPX which recorded growth of 636.30% and 11.22% 
respectively. Between 2007 and 2010, AAL reached a price high of USD70.20 in June 2008, 
before losing 79.54% in value to record a lowest price of USD14.36 eight months later. Before 
falling 51.46% to reaching a low of USD18.59 in February 2009, BHP reached a high of 
USD42.70 in October 2007. The SPX recorded a high of 1549.36 in October 2007 before 
dropping to a low of 735.09 in February 2009, a loss in value of 52.56%.  
AAL therefore experienced a loss in share price value fifty percent greater than the market (SPX) 
while BHP lost only seven percent more than the market in value. Furthermore, both BHP and 
SPX subsequently returned to their recorded highs whereas AAL never has.  





















This inferior performance of AAL against both the market and another diversified mines raises 
the question as to why it developed so poorly. While there may be any number of reasons, this 
study investigates the capital structure leading up to AAL’s marked share price’s decline and the 
period following it. While we do not argue that the management of AAL should have foreseen 
the debt crisis of 2008, it is reasonable to expect management to follow a robust capital structure. 
Of particular interest is the share repurchase program first adopted by AAL in 2006 which 
continued until 2008, the period immediately preceding the debt crisis. 
In this study, we analyse the actual capital structure followed by AAL during the period 2004 to 
2012 and compare this to an estimated optimal structure for the same period. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a review of existing literature. 
Section 2 details the share repurchase program adopted and implemented by AAL. Section 3 lays 
out the methodology used to determine the historic capital structure of AAL and optimal capital 
structure estimate. Section 4 provides the result of the analysis. Section 5 considers other 
theoretical arguments for share repurchase decisions and investigate the relevance of these to 
AAL. The paper concludes in Section 6. Full working of the model used are shown in appendices. 
1. Review of literature 
Share repurchases 
Since the legalization of share repurchases, share repurchase programs have gained increased 
popularity. Internationally, particularly in the USA, the impact of share repurchases has been 
widely researched. The majority of this research has focused on the effect of share repurchases 
on returns. In South Africa, the research on share repurchases is extremely limited. 
Firms can return cash funds to shareholders in one of two ways: declaring a dividend or 
repurchasing stock. Historically, dividends have been the preferred method for managers to return 
cash to shareholders. However, since the introduction of share repurchases, the instances of 
repurchases have increased, to the detriment of dividend declarations. 
Share repurchases rose in popularity in the USA from 1982 after the adoption by the SEC of a 
safe harbour rule that protected companies from being sued for price manipulation (Brockman, 
Khurana & Martin, 2008). Until then, companies had been reluctant to repurchase shares due to 
the perception of market manipulation that they carried. Since then, the number of shares 
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repurchased has increased dramatically. By the late 1990s, the value of repurchased shares 
exceeded that of dividends paid to shareholders of AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE listed companies 
for the first time (Hencock & White, 2007). In Europe, it was only in the late 1990s that share 
repurchases gained increasing attention, mainly because repurchases were widely illegal before 
then (Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013). In some countries, the slow adoption of share repurchases 
was due to the fact that open-market repurchases were considered to be price manipulation 
(Grullon & Michaely, 2002). Today, open-market share repurchases are the most popular relative 
to Dutch auctions or tender offers (Stephens & Weisbach, 1998). In South Africa, share 
repurchases have been legal since 1999. 
Generally, share repurchases have been found to precede positive abnormal share price returns. 
Ikenberry et al (1995) find a long-run abnormal return for value stocks for a period of four years 
following a repurchase announcement. They study the abnormal returns following open-market 
repurchases by ASE, NASDAQ and NYSE listed companies from 1980 to 1990 and find a 3.5% 
response to the initial announcement and 12.1% return (above initial announcement reaction) to 
a four-year buy-and-hold strategy following a repurchase announcement. Furthermore, the return 
is greater for companies with high book-to-market ratios or out-of-favour companies. They report 
a 45.3% above average return for such companies (Ikenberry, Lakonishok & Vermaelen, 1995). 
Open-market stock repurchase announcements have empirically been found to result in share 
price increases, regardless of whether shares were actually repurchased (Oded, 2005). 
A number of ideas have been hypothesized as to why share repurchases may be preferred over 
dividends. Relative to dividends, share repurchases preserve a company’s financial flexibility as 
they do not commit a company to additional future payouts in the same way that dividends do 
(Jagannathan, Stephens & Weisbach, 2000). In addition, companies announcing open-market 
share repurchase programs are not obligated to repurchase the specific number of shares. 
Although companies are not bound to their dividend payout policies, in practice companies do 
risk a decrease in share price as a result of a dividend cut. In this way, repurchases provide greater 
flexibility with none of the risks (to share price) of dividends. Repurchases are therefore a good 
way to make cash repayments to shareholders that may not be sustainable, without risk to the 
share price in the future (Jagannathan, Stephens & Weisbach, 2000). In support of this notion, 
their study suggests that companies with more volatile cash flows are more likely to use share 
repurchases that dividends (Jagannathan, Stephens & Weisbach, 2000). Skinner (2008) finds that, 
for both firms that have always paid dividends and for firms that only make repurchases, 
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repurchases increasingly substitute for dividends (Skinner, 2008). Others report that repurchases 
are positively related to both expected and unexpected cash flow (Stephens & Weisbach, 1998). 
Fama & French (2001) find that in the USA, large companies and more profitable firms are more 
likely to pay dividends, while companies with more investment opportunities are less likely to 
pay dividends. 
Part of the reason for the reported decline of dividends paid by listed companies in the USA over 
the past few decades is the change in the characteristics of new firms listing. As discussed by 
Fama & French (2001), for the period before 1999, the new firms that listed before 1978 were 
more profitable that those that listed after 1978. This decline in profitability of newly listed 
companies after 1978 is accompanied by a decline in dividends paid. Where one third of newly 
listed firms paid a dividend before 1978, only 3.7% of newly listed firms paid a dividend between 
1978 and 1999 (Fama & French, 2001). However, this does not fully explain the decrease in 
dividends paid. That same study finds that, not only are newly listed firms moving away from 
dividend payments, but all firms are, regardless of their characteristics (Fama & French, 2001).  
This move away from dividends was accompanied by a move to greater share repurchases. From 
the time that repurchases were made legal, USA companies have been substituting repurchases 
for dividends (Grullon & Michaely, 2002).  
Interestingly, Grullon & Michaely (2002) find no statistically significant negative market 
reactions to dividend decreases for companies that repurchase shares. This is in contrast to their 
findings for companies that do not repurchase their shares.  
Motives for share repurchases 
Many theories exist as to what would motivate companies to repurchase their shares. The most 
prominent of these is the signaling hypothesis. Share repurchase programs may convey two 
different signals to the market. The first is that no new suitable investment opportunities exist 
which could earn shareholders their required return. It is therefore better to return free cash to 
shareholders in the form of repurchases in order for shareholders to invest it themselves. The 
second, and more importantly, is that managers believe the company is undervalued. Under the 
latter scenario, it is believed that mangers have better knowledge of the company, its future 
prospects and therefore its value, than the market does. An announcement of a share repurchase 
program would therefore be a positive signal to the market. Vermaelen (1981) finds that the 
signaling hypothesis explains a large extent, larger than the other hypothesis, of the abnormal 
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returns recorded after a tender offer. Stephens & Weisbach (1998) find that “repurchases are 
negatively related to prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing 
depending on its degree of perceived undervaluation”. 
Opponents of share repurchases feared the possibility of insider trading as a result of market 
signals which could be manipulated by managers (Vermaelen, 1981). They feared that because 
open-market share repurchase announcements do not commit managers to those repurchases, 
managers may use repurchase announcements as a way of misleading the market in the hope that 
this will increase the company’s share price. As discussed above, Stephen & Weisbach (1998) 
argue that open-market share repurchases are increasingly popular due to the financial flexibility 
which they provide to managers and not as a result of managers trying to manipulate their firm’s 
share price.    
Alternative motivations for repurchasing shares include capital structure adjustments, take-over 
defenses, personal tax considerations and wealth expropriation from bondholders. In this study 
the focus lies on the motive relating to capital structure adjustments. 
Capital structure 
The theory of capital structure has been the subject of much research and debate ever since the 
seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, even with all this 
attention, these still is no consensus as to what constitutes an optimal capital structure. Modigliani 
and Miller first purported that the make-up of a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant. 
Graham et al (2014) find that the aggregate debt-to-capital ratio of unregulated firms ranged from 
10% to 15% from 1920 to 1945. From 1945 to 1970, this leverage tripled to 35%, above which it 
remained post 1970 to 1990. If non-debt liabilities were to be included in the leverage calculation, 
leverage increased to 60% by 1990. This increase in leverage resulted not only from an increase 
in liabilities of firms, but also from a lesser utilization of current assets, especially cash. Where 
cash and current assets made up 25% of assets in 1945, this percentage fell to only 6% in 1970 
and 10% in 2010. The leverage of nonfinancial regulated firm, on the other hand, remained stable 
over the same period. Furthermore, Graham et al (2014) find little contribution of firm 
characteristics to their findings. Most especially, they find traditional empirical models based on 
firm characteristics are unable of explaining the capital structure trends recorded over the past 
century (1920 to 2010). They therefore hypothesis that, with firm characteristics unable to explain 
the change in leverage, such change must have been due to macroeconomic influences. The 
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factors that they consider are taxes, economic uncertainty financial sector development, 
managerial incentives and government borrowing. 
Of these, the factor found to have the largest effect on leverage was government leverage (i.e. 
Federal debt to GDP). The relationship between government debt and corporate debt was found 
to be negative with a one standard deviation increase in government leverage associated with a 
quarter standard deviation decrease in the leverage of unregulated firms. This effect was 
significantly larger than for any other macroeconomic factor. 
Other than a positive relationship found between leverage and the output of the financial sector, 
Graham et al (2014) find no other macroeconomic factors to have a statistically significant 
impacts on corporate leverage.  
Studies on corporate capital have focused of four main themes to explain the determinants of 
capital structure. These four main themes are agency costs, signaling or asymmetric information, 
products and market interactions and corporate control. 
The main concern of these theories is the benefit of debt versus equity, and the effects debt can 
have versus equity on the relevant topic of study. These theories are discussed on more detail 
below.  
Agency costs 
Agency costs refers to the conflict of interests between stakeholders. This conflict arises where 
one stakeholder’s interests in maximizing its own benefit is to the detriment, or at least not to the 
benefit, of another. Jensen & Meckling (1976) identify conflicts between “managers and 
shareholders and between shareholders and debt holders”. Conflicts between managers and 
shareholders arise, as mangers do not achieve total gain from their profit maximizing efforts as 
they are entitled to less than 100% of any resultant profits. Instead, this entitlement held by 
shareholders. Managers, however, bear the total cost of their efforts. As a result, managers my 
reduce their profit maximizing efforts, while at the same time consuming more company 
resources. The authors term these resources consumed by managers for personal gain, 
“perquisites”. The consequence of this conflict between managers and shareholders is that 
managers reduce their profit maximizing efforts in exchange for consuming these perquisites. 
Furthermore, the extent of this conflict is greater in the case where managers hold less equity. 
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The agency cost theory of capital structure therefore suggests that debt can reduce the conflict 
between managers and shareholders by increasing the equity claim of managers. In addition, debt 
reduces the perquisites available to managers as cash resources previously available (in the 
absence of debt) now become tied to servicing the debt. This reduction in conflict between 
managers and shareholders, though the adoption of debt, therefore supports ceteris paribus the 
increase in debt in corporate financing.  
The conflict between shareholders and debt holders results where shareholders are incentivised 
to invest sub-optimally. Where an investment is successful, shareholders enjoy the majority of 
the gain, while debt holders capture only the value of the debt. However, where an investment is 
unsuccessful, debt holders bear the loss. In this way, shareholders are incentivised to adopt risky 
investments in the interest of high returns, while at the same time bearing the same risk, i.e. at 
most, the face value of the debt. However, the cost borne by debt holders can be transferred to 
shareholders where debt holders can foresee the future risky investing behavior of shareholders 
and consequently increase the cost of debt originated. Shareholders will then receive a lower price 
for their debt and be less incentivized to undertake risky investments. This is referred to as the 
“asset substitution effect”. 
Considering these conflicts, an optimal capital structure would be found where these agency costs 
are mitigated by the adoption of debt.  
Signaling or asymmetric information 
Under the theories of asymmetric information, managers are considered to hold inside or private 
information regarding the company. A number of theories therefore seek to explain how debt can 
covey this inside information of managers, to outsiders. As first suggested by Ross (1977) and 
Leyland & Pyle (1977) the capital structure of a company can convey this inside information to 
outsiders. Alternatively, as first suggested by Myers & Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), capital 
structure “is designed to mitigate the inefficiencies in the firm’s investment decisions that are 
caused by the information asymmetry” (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
In the model developed by Ross (1977), managers know the distribution of company returns, 
while shareholders do not. Where managers benefit from the company’s securities being highly 
valued but stand to lose in the case of bankrupt, larger debt levels are a signal to investors of a 
higher quality company. Managers of low quality firms are dissuaded from imitating higher 




Companies trade-off the benefits derived from debt financing with the costs arising from adopting 
increasing levels of leverage such as higher interest rates and the risk of potential bankruptcy 
costs. 
Bankruptcy costs may include: loss of customers and key employees, higher interest rates, 
inability to undertake value-adding projects, distraction of management away from core 
functions, reductions in research and development and competitors are provided with an 
advantage (Correia, et al., 2011). 
Pecking order theory 
The Pecking order theory assumes that there is not target capital structure. Instead, this theory 
suggests that finance is raised in accordance with a preferred hierarchy. First, it is preferred that 
projects be financed from retained earnings. Once retained earnings are exhausted, additional 
funding will be provided by way of debt. Lastly, the issuing of equity is the least preferred method 
of finance. By following this approach, companies always use the cheaper means of finance 
before moving to a more expensive alternative. 
Review of other empirical studies of capital structure 
Morellec (2001) investigate the relationship between corporate debt liquidity and capital structure 
and finds liquidity increased leverage only when bond covenants restrict the sale of assets. 
However, in the case of unsecured debt, he finds that “greater liquidity increased credit spreads 
on corporate debt and reduces optimal leverage” (Batten & Hogan, 2002). 
Korajczyk & Levy (2003) model the target capital structures of firms as a function of 
macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific variables. They base their analysis on financially 
“constrained” and “unconstrained” firms. They use the following criteria in classifying a firm as 
being financially constrained:  “1) the firm does not have a net repurchase of debt or equity and 
does not pay dividends within the event window, and 2) the firm’s Tobin’s Q, defined as the sum 
of the market value of equity and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of assets, at 
the end of the event quarter should be greater than one. A firm-event window is labeled as 
financially unconstrained if it does not meet these two criteria”. Based on these criteria, Korajczyk 
& Levy (2003) find 565 firm-event windows as financially constrained and 5095 as 
unconstrained. They conclude that “target leverage is counter-cyclical for the unconstrained 
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sample, but pro-cyclical for the constrained sample”. In other words, “macroeconomic conditions 
are significant for the issue choice for unconstrained firms but less so for constrained firms” 
(Korajczyk & Levy, 2003). 
Kayhan & Titman (2007) investigate the effect of cash flows, capital expenditure and stock price 
histories on debt ratios. They find that stock price changes and external capital have strong 
influences on capital structure changes. However, they find that over the long-term, firms tend to 
move towards a target capital structure (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). 
In analysing the effects of industry deregulation on capital structure, Ovtchinnikov (2010) finds 
that, following deregulation, firms experience a decline in leverage in response to the significant 
decline in profitability and increased growth opportunities. Following deregulation, leverage is 
found to be more positively correlated to firm size and negatively correlated to earnings volatility.  
Furthermore, consistent with trade-off theory, following deregulation, firms that are “above their 
target capital structure issue significantly more equity in the first few years following 
deregulation” (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). 
Many firms set target capital structures, although it may take a significant amount of time to 
achieve this target. Other firms which meet their target capital structure may deviate from it. Uysal 
(2011) finds that firms planning acquisitions take these deviations from their targeted capital 
structures into account. Over-leveraged firms, relative to their target, are less likely to make 
acquisitions and are less likely to make offers of cash. Such firms also acquire smaller targets and 
pay lower premiums (Uysal, 2011).   
Consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory, Danis et al (2014) find that when firms are close to 
or at their optimal leverage, “the cross-sectional correlation between profitability and leverage is 
positive” while otherwise the correlation is found to be negative (Danis, Rettl & Whited, 2014). 
Hovakimian et al (2004) investigate whether firm operating performance affects corporate 
financing behaviour. Considering firms which issue both new equity and debt, Hovakimian et al 
(2004) suggest that firms with high market-to-book values have low target debt ratios. 
Furthermore, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance, with no effect on 





2. AAL’s share repurchase program 
The share repurchase program implemented by AAL in 2006 marked the first time that the 
company had undertaken such a program. Share repurchases were first mentioned by AAL in its 
2005 Annual Report with the following statement:  
“Our strong financial position affords us the opportunity to return USD1.5 billion 
of capital in 2006 in the form of a USD1 billion buyback as well as a USD0.5 billion 
special dividend. The capital structure will be reviewed regularly in light of market 
conditions, operating cash flows and progress on strategic delivery and capital 
projects.” 
AAL’s share repurchase program commenced in March 2006. The first repurchase program 
adopted by AAL, it was originally intended to return USD9 billion to shareholders (USD6 billion 
announced in 2006 and USD3 billion announced in 2007) via three tranches of repurchases. 
During 2006, the company repurchased USD3.9 billion worth of stock.1 The addition USD3 
billion repurchase program announced in February 2007 was completed by August of that year. 
It was followed by an announcement of an addition USD4 billion repurchase program, USD1.3 
billion of which had been completed by February 2008. In total, USD1.7 billion of the intended 
USD4 billion of the third repurchase program was completed before its suspension in October 
2008. The share repurchase program was suspended as a result of the onset on the global liquidity 
crises at that time in 2008. However, the repurchase program was never resumed. 
In addition, there is no information or guidance provided as to what the target capital structure of 
AAL is. However, in the Director’s Report in the 2004 Annual Report of AAL, it is stated that 
during the Annual General Meeting to take place in April 2005, renewal would be sought for the 
following existing authority of directors to: 
“make market purchases of up to a maximum of 149 million ordinary shares of $0.50 
each of the Company, being up to 10% of the ordinary issued share capital at 22 
February 2005, at a price not less than $0.50 and not exceeding 105% of the average 
middle market closing price of such shares on the London Stock Exchange on the 
five dealing days prior to the date of repurchase.” 
                                                     
1 Page 35 of AAL’s 2006 Annual Report. 
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Of relevance is a comment contained in the same statement regarding earnings per share and 
capital structure: 
“The directors have no present intention of exercising this authority and would only 
do so if they considered it was in the best interests of shareholders generally and if 
the purchase could be expected to result in an increase in earnings per share… 
Treating the bought-back shares as treasury shares gives the Company the ability to 
sell or transfer them quickly and cost-effectively and provides the Company with 
additional flexibility in the management of its capital base” 
This statement points to the desire of AAL’s directors to use repurchased shares (held as treasury 
shares) as a means of actively and managing the company’s capital structure. 
Commenting on the specific share repurchase program adopted by AAL, the following 
statement was in the Director’s Report contained in AAL’s 2006 Annual Report: 
“The strong cash generation from our operations, as well as proceeds from non-
core disposals, resulted in 2006 in the announcement of a $7.5 billion return of 
capital in the form of share buybacks and special dividends – one of the highest 
levels of capital return in the industry – in addition to $1.4 billion in ordinary 
dividends paid in 2006 and a further $1.1 billion final dividend recommended in 
2007. 
The Group produced record underlying earnings of $5.5 billion, 46% higher than 
2005, with record production levels at many of its mining operations. With strong 
cash flow, the Group announced during 2006 and early 2007 the return of $10.5 
billion to shareholders through share buybacks and special dividends.” 
3. Methodology 
Historical capital structure reported by AAL 
The approached followed in this study is to determine what may be considered to be an optimal 
capital structure for AAL. This is done by determining optimal levels of debt and equity without 
making any assumptions regarding changes to AAL’s operations. Operating profit is therefore 
kept constant at the values actually reported by AAL in the years under review. To do so, an 
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optimal weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) is determined for AAL for each of the years 
2004 to 2012. This nine-year period was chosen on the basis that it includes the years prior, during 
and after the share repurchase program was implemented by AAL. Data constraints limited an 
analysis of years earlier than 2004.  
The analysis prepared in this study relies on the principles of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(“CAPM”) in order to determine the cost of equity (“COE”) of AAL. Criticism of the CAPM is 
widely documented, and while beyond the scope of this paper, these criticisms have been briefly 
discussed below. However, for the reasons discussed in support of the CAPM, the CAPM 
methodology was considered suitable and has been used for the purposes of this study. 
All analyses are performed in USD, the functional currency of AAL. 
In order to evaluate the actual cost of capital achieved by AAL over the period under review, as 
found below, we follow a methodology put forward by Damodaran (2004) which considers an 
optimal capital structure. An optimal capital structure for AAL is proposed using a cost of capital 
method. The process involves determining an optimal capital structure by selecting the debt-to-
capital ratio that results in the lowest WACC. The COE, cost of debt (“COD”) and resultant 
WACC are calculated for each year 2004 to 2012 and for every decile of the debt-to-capital ratio. 
These analyses of COE, COD and WACC are discussed below.  
Given that the cost of capital is comprised of COE and COD, changing the respective weights of 
these two variables may alter the cost of capital. Under this approach, we calculate the COE and 
the COD at different levels of debt and equity. The WACC is then calculated from these two 
components for the each of the different debt levels. At the lowest cost of capital in each respective 
year it can be said that the optimal capital structure is found and that the firm’s value is maximised. 
The WACC is defined as the weighted average of the different types of financing used by the 
firm, namely equity and debt: 
WACC = We x Ke + Wd x Kd,  
where We equals the weighting of equity as a percentage of capital, E/(D+E); Ke equals the cost 
of equity; Wd equals the weighting of debt as a percentage of capital, D/(D+E); and Kd equals 
the cost of debt. 
The components of the WACC for AAL and how they were determined are discussed below. 
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Cost of Equity and the CAPM 
As stated above, the approach used in this paper to investigate the capital structure of AAL makes 
use of the CAPM to determine the COE component of the WACC.  
Much of the criticism leveled against the CAPM is due to the CAPM’s reliance on historical data 
for the prediction of future outcomes. It is fair to say that the CAPM is largely used in valuation 
exercises, which require an analysis and consideration of future expectations. In this scenario, the 
use of historical data can only be accurate if future expectations do no differ from historical 
results. This constraint is obviously problematic. However, this study relies on the CAPM not for 
valuation purposes, but for calculating the actual historic WACC position of AAL for the period 
2004 to 2010. As no assumptions of future expectations are required, the use of historical data 
relating to these years was appropriate and not subject to the historical data problem of the CAPM. 
Further criticism is leveled against the CAPM as many consider it to lack empirical support. 
Despite this criticism leveled against the CAPM based on a lack of empirical evidence in its 
favour, it continues to be widely used by managers and financial analysts. In its survey of 
Australian financial analysts and corporate financiers, KPMG reported that the CAPM is the most 
common method used to derive cost of equity, with 82% of respondents reporting that they always 
use the CAPM (KPMG, 2013). Zero respondents reported using the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. 
PWC found a comparable preference for the CAPM in South Africa. In its 2009/2010 survey, 
PWC reported that the CAPM was “the primary methodology used to estimate the cost of equity, 
with all respondents stating that they either always or frequently use it” (PWC, 2010). This is 
further corroborated by JP Morgan which states that “most practitioners use CAPM as their 
method of choice to estimate the cost of capital” (Zenner, et al., 2008). 
Therefore, despite criticism against the CAPM, is continues to be the most commonly used 
method for determining cost of equity. It therefore does not seem unreasonable to assume that 
capital structure designs and decisions are made, in practice, based to a large degree, on the 
CAPM. It is therefore not unlikely that AAL’s management may also have relied on the CAPM 
when making decisions regarding capital structure. 
It is for this reason that the CAPM is considered an appropriate methodology for use in this paper 
to analyse the historical capital structure of AAL.  
Ke = RFR + β x ERP 
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where Ke equals the costs of equity, RFR is the risk-free rate, β represents the regression beta of 
AAL and ERP is set as the equity risk premium. 
Risk-free rate 
The USA 10-year Treasury bond rate was chosen as the representative risk-free rate used in this 
analysis. There are a few reasons for this choice of rate. Firstly, Treasury bonds are dollar 
denominated and therefore match the currency of our analysis (the functional currency of AAL). 
Furthermore, the USA market is one of the most diverse and liquid and is considered to be largely 
default free. Furthermore, using a long-term bond rate, instead of a short-term bill, better matches 
the term of project undertaken by AAL, as well as the period of our analysis.   
The annual arithmetic mean values of daily data were used in the analysis. 
Table 1: Risk-free rate 
10-Year Treasury (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Rate on 10-Year Treasury Bonds 4.27 4.29 4.80 4.63 3.66 3.26 3.22 2.78 1.80 
Beta 
Beta, another component of the CAPM, represents the sensitivity of an individual stock to changes 
in the market, which has a beta coefficient of one. It represents the systematic risk of a stock, that 
risk which cannot be eliminated through diversification. 
Beta values were determined for AAL for each of the years 2004 to 2012. The betas calculated 
were not forward-looking, but actual betas calculated from historical data. Betas were calculated 
by regressing the returns of AAL against the returns of the SPX.  
A beta period of five-year monthly returns was used. In choosing the period over which to 
estimate the regression betas, care must be taken to choose a period which is long enough to 
contain sufficient information, but which is also not so long that is no longer reflects the true 
nature of the business. Two points are relevant here. First, as AAL is predominantly involved in 
mining operations, five years does not represent a long time period when considering the long 
lead times of mining projects, nor has its business operations changed significantly over time. 
Secondly, again, the beta estimates are not required for forecasting purposes. Rather, the beta 




Table 2: Regression betas 
Regression Betas 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Regression Beta 0.82 0.90 0.83 1.53 1.69 1.87 1.88 1.74 1.72 
R2 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.31 0.46 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.56 
Equity risk premium 
The equity risk premium (“ERP”) is perhaps the most contentious component of the CAPM. 
While the CAPM speaks of a market portfolio comprising all securities, no such measurable 
portfolio exists in reality. 
In choosing a specific index as a representation of the market, according to the CAPM, the choice 
of index should not be based on the specific industry or location in which the tested party operates. 
Instead, the choice of index should be that which best reflects the market portfolio, as required by 
the CAPM. Therefore, while AAL has its primary listing on the FTSE, the SPX was chosen as it 
is considered to best represent the market portfolio, due to the fact that is contains a large number 
of liquid stocks and is well diversified and therefore better meets the criteria of a market portfolio. 
However, even after a determination of the market portfolio is made, a number of challenges 
remain in determining a suitable ERP. How can the market premium then be measured over the 
risk-free rate? A common method is to measure the return of equities over the risk free rate. Again, 
the issue arises as to what period and measure of return should be used.  
The ERP is typically calculated using historical data as the average realised return of an equity 
index over the average realized return of USA Treasury Bonds. However, the choice of time 
period, as well as the choice of arithmetic or geometric average can significantly affect the result.  
Such a method also does not account for changes in the ERP as a result of changing market 
conditions, for example. The following table presents various measures of the ERP prepared by 
JP Morgan (Zenner, et al., 2008). 
Table 3: Equity risk premiums 
Large company stocks – Intermediate Treasury Bonds 
Period Arithmetic mean Geometric mean 
1926 – 2007 6.9% 5.1% 
1946 – 2007 6.8% 5.7% 
1978 – 2007 5.7% 4.9% 
Source: Table taken from Zenner, et al. (2008) 
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An alternative method for determining the ERP is to use a dividend discount model. However, 
this method requires predicting a number of variables of the model, namely expected dividends, 
earnings and perpetual growth rates. This reliance on forecasted variables therefore poses a 
weakness of the model. Furthermore, if expected dividends are not frequently updated, then 
dividend discount model also suffers from the problem of not being able to account for changes 
in market conditions. 
The Sharpe Method is yet another approach which can be used to estimate the ERP. JP Morgan 
calculates, using a Sharpe ratio of 0.3 for the SPX (as a proxy for the market), that the ERP ranged 
from 8.2% in 1998 to 7.2% in 2008. The rates for each of the ten years in shown in the table below 
(Zenner, et al., 2008). 
Table 4: Market risk premiums 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Average 
MRP 8.2% 7.8% 7.4% 7.9% 8.0% 6.6% 4.6% 3.9% 3.7% 5.2% 7.2% 
Given the range of methods that can be used to calculate ERP, the question arises which method 
to use. It is difficult to prescribe one method as being better than another. We have therefore 
presented a number of different methods and some corresponding result in order to give an 
indication of the expected ERP. For the purpose of this analysis, the arithmetic average return of 
the SPX over Treasury bonds over the period 1928 to 2010 is used. This ERP rate is obtained 
from research by Damodaran (2006), which is consistent with the above research. 
Cost of debt 
The determination of the COD in our analysis relies on two components; the risk-free rate and the 
default spread relevant to AAL over the risk-free rate. Being a large listed entity and an important 
company in the global mining industry, AAL was rated by all three of the major credit rating 
agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) over the period of review. Default spreads were 
referenced from the Moody’s MIR database. 
Moody’s credit ratings where used for the purpose of our analysis in order to be consistent with 
Moody’s data used for determining credit default spreads.  





As discussed above, the risk-free rate used in the calculation of the cost of debt is the USA 10-
year Treasury bond rate. 
Default spread 
To determine the appropriate default spread, AAL’s credit ratings for the years 2004 to 2012 were 
used. These ratings were obtained from the Bloomberg database.  
The Moody’s ratings for AAL were then used to determine the default spread. The reason for this 
is that the Moody’s data of spreads per rating, based on date and maturity, were used to determine 
the appropriate default spreads. Default spread data were obtained from the Moody’s MIR 
database. The Moody’s ratings were therefore used to match this data. Default spreads per rating 
were calculated per year as the arithmetic mean of daily default spread rates over USA Treasury 
bonds and maturity was set at ten-years. 
Moody’s credit ratings of AAL were taken as applicable at the end of the respective financial 
years. 
Table 5: AAL ratings and corresponding Moody's default spreads 
Moody's compiled default spreads 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
S&P rating BBB BBB A- A A A- A- A- A- 
Moody’s rating Baa1 Baa1 A3 A2 A2 A3 A3 A3 A3 
Default spread (b.p.) 237 235 499 180 90 101 51 76 163 
Taxation 
The tax rate used is the marginal UK corporate income tax rate. AAL is incorporated and tax 
resident in the UK. It is for this reason that the UK rate is used. AAL does quote its effective tax 
rate in its financial statements, however, this is nevertheless not considered appropriate as the 
effective tax rate may be affected by items not related to the interest bearing debt of AAL. 
Table 6: Taxation rates 
Taxation rate (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
UK marginal tax rates* 30 30 30 30 30 28 28 26 24 
AAL effective tax rates** 30 26.5 32.7 31.8 33.4 33.1 31.9 28.3 29.0 




Market value of equity 
For the same reasons discussed below in respect of debt, the market value of equity is used for 
analysis purposes, instead of book value.  
In order to determine the market value of equity, the average number of shares outstanding is 
multiplied by the average market price of AAL common stock, for each of the years 2004 to 2012. 
This information was obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
Market value of debt 
In order to determine the value of AAL’s debt, the market value of debt was considered. Another 
measure of debt that could be used is book value. However, a number of arguments exist for the 
use of book values instead of market values (Damodaran, 2004). The first is that book values are 
less volatile than market values and are therefore more reliable. Although book values are more 
consistent than market values, it is for this reason that market values are considered to be a better 
indication of true value of debt as they change as and when new information is revealed. The 
second argument is that the use of book values is a more conservative approach to valuing debt. 
However, this argument assumes that market values of debts will always be lower than book 
values, which may not be correct. Furthermore, even in the case where market values are lower 
than book values, the cost of capital calculated using these book values will be lower than if 
market values are used, which does not suggest a more conservative approach. Another argument 
may be that debt is lent based on book values, and not market values. However, it cannot be said 
that debt is lent against assets valued at book value rather than market value (Damodaran, 2004). 
In their empirical research, Sweeny et al (1997) find that the use of book values in measuring debt 
distorts debt-to-equity ratio and cost of capital calculations. The distortion is especially found in 
time-series capital structure studies (Sweeny, Warga & Winters, 1997). 
Although a portion of AAL debts, in the form of corporate bonds, are listed and traded, not all of 
AAL’s debt is liquidly traded. In addition, as AAL is the parent company of the Group, a number 
of different entities within the group obtain debt of varies different kinds. The market value of 
AAL’s debt is therefore not readily available. It is therefore necessary to estimate the market value 
of AAL’s debt. To do so, we used an approach of Damodaran (2004) and calculated the market 
value of debt by treating the book value of debt as a coupon bond with the coupon equal to the 
actual interest expense recorded and the maturity equal to the weighted average maturity of the 
debt. Cost of debt is set as the current cost of debt of AAL as calculated by the sum of the risk-
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free rate and relevant default spread. Using this approach, the market value of debt of AAL for 
each of the years 2004 to 2012 can then be calculated as the current value of the bond: 
MV of Debtt = IEt x [(1-1/(1+it)m)/it]+DebtBV/(1+it)m 
where IEi equals the interest expense reported by AAL in year t, i equals the cost of debt in year 
t, m equals the weighted average maturity of debt outstanding in year t, and DebtBV is set as the 
reported book value of debt in year t. 
The COD used in the equation above is the COD previously described as the risk-free rate plus 
the appropriate default spread based on AAL’s reported Moody’s credit rating. The weighted 
average maturity of debt outstanding is calculated form AAL’s corporate bonds outstanding 
during the period under review, 2004 to 2012. The results are shown below. 
Table 7: Market value of AAL debt 
Market value of AAL debt 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Weighted average 
maturity (years) 4.29 3.08 2.29 1.51 3.42 5.27 5.41 4.83 4.95 
Market value of 
debt (USD 
millions) 
12826 9804 6899 8775 13648 12330 11950 11075 16202 
Book value of 
debt (USD 
millions) 
11200 8439 6248 8299 13995 14315 13439 12873 17635 
Optimal Capital Structure determination  
An optimal capital structure for AAL for each of the years 2004 to 2012 is estimated by 
considering the WACC of AAL over a range of debt levels. By analysis the outcomes of the 
estimated COE and COD for AAL when debt is increased from a debt-to-capital ratio of 0% to a 
ratio of 90%, the WACC is calculated for each level of debt. An optimal capital structure can 
then, by definition, be found where the WACC is minimised. The CAPM is again used to estimate 
COE for AAL in the model of ever increasing debt levels.  
The COE is estimated for each level of debt (and equity) as defined by each decile of the debt-to-
capital ratios. Calculations are performed for each of the scenarios where the debt-to-capital ratio 
is increased by ten percentage points from 0% to 90%. Hence, ten COE calculations are performed 
for each of the nine years under review. The scenario of 100% debt-to-capital is not investigated, 
as this does not depict a possible or realistic financing option. 
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The first component of the CAPM calculation of COE is beta. As discussed above, the actual 
historical beta values for AAL were calculated using a regression analysis of the five-year 
monthly returns of AAL and the SPX. Due to the fact that these regression beta values are 
calculated using historical data, they reflect the actual leverage positions of AAL over each of the 
periods calculated, respectively i.e. five-year mean leverage. It is therefore necessary to remove 
this effect of historical leverage from the regression beta values to obtain pure beta values. This 
is termed ‘unlevering’ the betas.  
BUL=BL/(1+(1-t) x D/E 
where BUL represents the unlevered beta; BL is the historic levered beta; t equals the marginal tax 
rate; and D/E equals the mean debt-to-equity ratio of the five-year period. 
In order to unlever the betas, the mean five-year debt-to-equity ratios over the corresponding beta 
periods were used. The resultant unlevered betas, for each year 2004-2012, therefore represent 
the historical regression betas adjusted to remove the effect of AAL’s historical leverage.  
The unlevered betas can then be used in our analysis of the different potential debt levels. These 
unlevered betas are then readjusted based on our ten tested debt scenarios. The unlevered betas 
are ‘re-levered’ using the relevant levels of debt and equity in the optimal cost of equity 
calculation. The re-levered betas are then used in our CAPM calculations of COE. 
BRL=BUL x [1+(1-tI) x DI/EI] 
where BRL represents the re-levered beta, tI is equal to the implied marginal tax rate and DI/EI is 
the implied debt to equity ratio. 
By implication, the COE cannot be calculated without the COD being calculated simultaneously. 
This is true because some of the variables used in the method of the COE calculation are required 
to calculate COD, not because they are defined variables in terms of the CAPM, but because of 
our adopted application method used. The common variable is the marginal tax rate and its effect 
in calculating the re-levered betas. Therefore although beta is traditional only a variable in the 
CAPM calculation of COE, in our application, marginal tax rates may be impacted by the 
respective debt levels and therefore the re-levered betas may also be affected by debt. As a result, 
the COE is impacted by applicable the debt levels and the associated debt costs. This dependent 
relationship will be discussed in detail below in the section explaining the estimation of COD. 
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Once the re-levered betas have been determined, the same risk-free rates and equity risk premium 
are used to calculate the new cost of equity values. 
Estimation of the COD 
Pre-tax cost of debt 
As for the calculation of the COE above, a COD value is calculated for each level of debt, for 
each year, 2004 to 2012. In estimating the optimal cost of capital, a similar process to that used 
to determine the actual cost of debt of AAL, is used. That is, the COD is calculated as the sum of 
the relevant risk-free rate and a suitable default spread, as determined by the company’s credit 
rating. Default spreads were again taken from the Moody’s MIR database, calculated as per 
annum arithmetic means from daily data, for each of the applicable credit ratings for the years 
2004 to 2012. 
As the level of debt changes, so too does its associated interest expense. The interest expense is 
determined both by the quantum of debt outstanding (as set by the debt scenario being tested) and 
by the applicable interest rate. However, as a company takes on increased debt, its risk profile, as 
represented by its credit rating, may increase, resulting in interest rates also increasing. Therefore, 
interest rates are not fixed but increase with increasing debt levels as credit ratings deteriorate.  
To begin with, the current COD is applied to calculate interest expenses. As discussed above, the 
current COD is calculated as the sum of an appropriate default spread, corresponding to the actual 
reported credit rating of AAL, and the risk-free rate. As debt is increased, interest expenses 
calculated at the current COD interest rate also increase, lowering interest-coverage ratios. Lower 
interest-coverage ratios may result is lower expected credit ratings and therefore new higher 
interest rates (higher COD). These new higher interest rates in-turn increase interest expenses, 
which must be recalculated based on the new interest rates. An iterative approach must therefore 
be followed. 
In performing this analysis, we implicitly assume that AAL can raise every level of debt and that 
all existing debt can be refinanced at the COD. Using this existing COD, the implied interest 
expense for each level of new debt is calculated. Once this has been determined, the implied 
interest-coverage ratios, for each year and for each level of debt, can be calculated. The implied 
interest-coverage ratio is used to evaluate whether any change in credit rating may be expected to 
occur due to the increased level of debt and its associated cost. In order to determine the new 
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synthetic credit ratings (hereafter referred to as “synthetic ratings”), the findings of Damodaran 
regarding interest-coverage ratios and their corresponding typical credit ratings are used 
(Damodaran, 2004). Damodaran evaluated the interest-coverage ratios and corresponding credit 
ratings of large USA companies and compiled a matrix of typical interest-coverage ratios and 
corresponding credit ratings. These ratings are then used to determine default spreads over the 
reference rate, the risk-free rate (which remains constant). Using Damodaran’s matrix, the implied 
interest-coverage ratios are used to identify the new corresponding synthetic ratings.  
Using interest-coverage ratios to determine credit ratings explicitly assumes that credit ratings are 
solely determined by interest coverage ratios. This is clearly a simple approach and not the case 
in practice. However, as explained by Damodaran, the interest-coverage ratio is used by ratings 
agencies in their ratings calculation and the ratio is significantly correlated to bond rating and 
other variables used in this approach (e.g. debt-coverage) (Damodaran, 2004). In addition as 
expected, the interest-coverage ratio changes as D/E ratios change. This is important in relation 
for our chosen method of analysis. The interest-coverage ratios and credit rating matrix compiled 
by Damodaran is shown in the table below. 
Table 8: Synthetic ratings based on interest cover ratio 
Synthetic ratings 
Interest-coverage (low) Interest-coverage (high) Moody’s Rating 
-100000.00 0.1999 D2 
0.20 0.6499 C2 
0.65 0.7999 Ca2 
0.80 1.2499 Caa 
1.25 1.4999 B3 
1.50 1.7499 B2 
1.75 1.9999 B1 
2.00 2.2499 Ba2 
2.25 2.4999 Ba1 
2.50 2.9999 Baa2 
3.00 4.2499 A3 
4.25 5.4999 A2 
5.50 6.4999 A1 
6.50 8.4999 Aa2 
8.50 100000.00 Aaa 
Once the synthetic rating and corresponding default spread have been obtained, the new implied 
interest rate is used to calculate a new implied interest expense and interest-coverage ratio. The 
same approach is followed again in an iterative process using the (higher) implied default spread 
and the same risk-free rate. The (higher) implied interest expense is recalculated in order to obtain 
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a new (lower) implied interest-coverage ratio. It should be stated again that throughout this 
iterative process, EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) remains unchanged. This reflects the 
fact that we assume that any new debt is not used to alter or expand operations, but rather merely 
for capitalisation purposes. That is, any new debt is used merely to reduce equity.  
In our analysis, EBIT is chosen as the income statement item representing operating profits. 
Strictly speaking, it is common and perhaps more correct to consider EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) as a true measure of operating profits. This is because 
EBITDA is not reduced by the non-cash items of depreciation and amortisation. EBITDA 
therefore represents the actual cash generated from operations. However, while this is true, it is 
not realistic to expect an asset intensive company, such as AAL, not to depreciate or amortize its 
assets for any extended length of time. Using EBITDA in our methodology would mean that our 
analysis would suffer from this problem. We therefore consider it more accurate to use EBIT as 
a measure of operating profit. In addition, using EBIT allows us to evaluate the effects of 
financing decisions on the tax shield. 
This circular iterative process is continued until it is found that the implied credit rating, and 
therefore the associated default spread and, remains stable. At that point, the COD is found. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the impact of increased interest expenses must simultaneously be 
considered in respect of the marginal tax rate. As discussed above, the UK marginal tax rate is 
used for the purposes of our analysis. However, in determining the optimal COD, it is necessary 
to consider, given the implied interest expense arising, whether the tax shield can actually be fully 
utilised, at each respective level of debt being analysed. As the debt-to-capital ratio increases from 
0% to 90%, the interest expense burden, as expected, increases significantly. However, at the 
same time, EBIT remains constant. The tax shield can therefore only be fully utilised where the 
implied interest expense is less than or equal to reported EBIT. Where the implied interest expense 
is greater than EBIT, so much of the interest expense that exceeds EBIT will not benefit from the 
tax shield as the deduction for tax purposes is limited to the value of EBIT (we refer here to the 
benefit that can be realised in the current year).  
High levels of debt are therefore not only more expensive as a result of poorer ratings, but are 
increasingly expensive in after-tax terms due to the reduced benefit of a tax deduction of interest 
or the tax shield in cases where the interest expense exceeds EBIT (i.e. not all interest can be 
deducted for tax purposes).  
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Increasing interest expense values to levels above EBIT therefore effectively result in reducing 
the marginal tax rate. The use of this implied marginal tax rate is appropriate as is accounts for 
the true scenario that any additional debt above that already considered (marginal debt) will not 
benefit at all from the tax shield. The cost of marginal debt is therefore automatically higher. The 
implied marginal tax rate is calculated as follows in cases where the implied interest expense 
exceeds EBIT: 
tI= EBIT/IE x t 
where, tI represents the implied marginal tax rate, EBIT equals the maximum tax benefit, IE equals 
the interest expense and t is set at the current marginal tax rate. 
Furthermore, as the marginal tax rate is included in the formula for the calculation of re-levered 
betas, so debt levels have a concomitant effect on re-levered betas and therefore the COE. 
Therefore, the values of the components of the calculation of the COD must be ascertained in 
order for the COE to be estimated. 
In the calculation of the COD at each level of debt in the analysis, no condition limiting the level 
of debt which may be adopted, based on the credit rating and associated default spread, is applied. 
However, although not explicitly stated by AAL in its Annual Reports, it is reasonable to expect 
that the company would target (if not be compelled to maintain) an investment grade credit rating 
at all times. Therefore, although the above analysis may indicate that AAL may have optimal 
capacity to adopt an increasing quantum of debt, where such quantum of debt pushes AAL to 
obtain a non-investment grade rating, such debt must be considered excessive and unsatisfactory. 
An investment grade rating is any rating up to and including a Moody’s Baa3 rating. Any rating 
below Baa3 (i.e. starting at rating Ba1) is classified as non-investment grade and in not accepted 
for the purposes of our analysis. In the case of such a scenario, we select the optimal capital ratio 
to be that which provides AAL with the lowest WACC, while at the same time maintaining an 
investment grade credit rating.   
4. Results 
Actual historic results for AAL 
As discussed above, we followed a CAPM approach for calculating the COE and resultant WACC 
for AAL for each of the years in the period 2004 to 2012. Using the methods described, the 
following results below were calculated for AAL. Based on actual historical results reported by 
 
 26 
AAL, we found AAL to have a WACC that ranged from 7.66% in 2004 to 9.72% in 2012. The 
highest WACC obtained by AAL was in 2010 at 13.00% 
Table 9: AAL's historical WACC 
AAL Actual historical results 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Cost of equity 
(%) 9.20 9.71 9.80 13.83 13.87 14.54 14.52 13.29 12.15 
After tax cost 




35259 50811 72926 80739 29664 58790 69838 49550 43235 
Market value 
of debt (USD 
million) 
12826 9804 6899 8775 13648 12330 11950 11075 16202 
Debt/Equity 
(%) 36.38 19.30 9.46 10.87 46.01 20.97 17.11 22.35 37.47 
WACC (%) 7.66 8.72 9.30 12.88 11.03 12.87 13.00 11.58 9.72 
As a comparison, we estimated an optimal capital structure position for AAL for 2004 to 2012. 
Optimal cost of capital 
Cost of equity 
In calculating the optimal COE, the historical regression betas for AAL were unlevered to remove 
the effects of historical leverage and re-levered to account for the leverage of the specific debt 
and equity levels we were testing. The results of the re-levered betas are shown below. 






2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0% 0% 0.77 0.83 0.76 1.38 1.45 1.62 1.63 1.48 1.41 
10% 11% 0.83 0.90 0.82 1.49 1.56 1.75 1.76 1.61 1.56 
20% 25% 0.90 0.98 0.89 1.62 1.70 1.91 1.92 1.76 1.76 
30% 43% 1.00 1.08 0.99 1.79 1.88 2.12 2.13 1.96 2.01 
40% 67% 1.13 1.22 1.11 2.02 2.12 2.40 2.41 2.22 2.35 
50% 100% 1.31 1.42 1.29 2.34 2.46 2.80 2.80 2.58 2.82 
60% 150% 1.58 1.71 1.56 2.83 2.96 3.49 3.39 3.13 3.52 
70% 233% 2.02 2.20 2.00 3.63 3.81 4.66 4.37 4.05 4.69 
80% 400% 3.01 3.24 2.89 5.24 5.49 6.99 6.33 5.88 7.04 
90% 900% 6.03 6.47 5.69 10.06 10.55 13.98 12.19 11.37 14.08 
 
The marginal tax rate impacts on the COD as interest on debt is tax deductible. However, as 
explained above, the marginal tax rate also affects the COE due to the impact of the implied 
marginal tax rate on our re-levered beta. As a result, we also show the implied marginal tax rates 
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below. The table below illustrates the changes in marginal tax rates as a result of increasing 
interest expenses. As expected, the tax shield is fully realised for low levels of debt. However, at 
high levels of debt, the implied marginal tax rate is reduced where the corresponding interest 
expense exceeds EBIT. 







Implied marginal taxation rates (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
10% 11% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 28.00 28.00 26.00 0.00 
20% 25% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 28.00 28.00 26.00 0.00 
30% 43% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 28.00 28.00 26.00 0.00 
40% 67% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 28.00 28.00 26.00 0.00 
50% 100% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 27.50 28.00 26.00 0.00 
60% 150% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 22.91 28.00 26.00 0.00 
70% 233% 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 19.64 28.00 26.00 0.00 
80% 400% 26.96 27.98 30.00 30.00 30.00 17.19 28.00 26.00 0.00 
90% 900% 23.97 24.87 27.88 30.00 30.00 15.28 28.00 26.00 0.00 
The effect on marginal tax rates can be clearly seen from the results in the table above. In 2012 
for example, AAL recorded a negative EBIT value. As a result, in terms of theory and our 
methodology applied, AAL should not have reported any debt in 2012 as if could not afford it. 
Of course, this is unrealistic as debt is not issued and repaid all in a single year. Instead, it is more 
correct to say that AAL should not have issued any new debt in 2012. Due to the fact that AAL 
could not afford the debt in 2012, at any level, it receives no tax shield benefit on the cost of the 
debt. The implied marginal tax rates are therefore shown as zero in 2012. 
The resultants COE estimates for each year under review and for each level of debt-to-equity are 
shown in the table below, 





Cost of Equity (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0% 0% 8.91 9.32 9.38 12.95 12.38 13.04 13.05 11.74 10.29 
10% 11% 9.27 9.71 9.73 13.60 13.06 13.82 13.83 12.47 11.23 
20% 25% 9.72 10.20 10.18 14.40 13.91 14.79 14.81 13.39 12.41 
30% 43% 10.30 10.82 10.75 15.44 15.00 16.05 16.08 14.58 13.93 
40% 67% 11.07 11.66 11.52 16.83 16.45 17.73 17.76 16.15 15.95 
50% 100% 12.15 12.84 12.59 18.77 18.48 20.12 20.12 18.36 18.78 
60% 150% 13.77 14.59 14.19 21.68 21.54 24.33 23.66 21.67 23.02 
70% 233% 16.48 17.53 16.86 26.53 26.62 31.36 29.56 27.20 30.10 
80% 400% 22.45 23.80 22.21 36.23 36.79 45.40 41.36 38.24 44.24 
90% 900% 40.63 43.31 39.13 65.33 67.31 87.54 76.74 71.37 86.68 
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Cost of debt 
Corresponding to increased levels of debt, interest expenses increase and in turn result in lower 
interest-coverage ratios being observed as a result of EBIT being held constant. Deteriorating 
interest-coverage ratios may in turn result in poorer credit ratings being obtained as leverage is 
increased. The implied credit ratings observed from our analysis are shown in the table below. 







Implied Moody’s credit ratings for AAL 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0% 0% Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
10% 11% Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa D2 
20% 25% Aa2 Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa A1 Aaa Aaa D2 
30% 43% A2 A1 A1 A1 Aaa A3 Aaa Aaa D2 
40% 67% A3 A2 A3 A3 Aaa B3 Aaa Aaa D2 
50% 100% A3 A3 A3 A3 Aa2 Caa Aa2 Aaa D2 
60% 150% B2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 A2 Caa A1 A1 D2 
70% 233% Caa B2 B2 B1 A2 Ca2 A2 A2 D2 
80% 400% Caa Caa Caa B3 A3 C2 A3 A3 D2 
90% 900% Ca2 Caa Caa Caa A3 C2 A3 A3 D2 
The results of our calculations using the circular iterative methodology find the after-tax COD 
estimates shown in the table below.  







After-tax cost of debt (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
10% 11% 3.09 3.25 3.63 3.62 3.28 2.99 2.87 2.66 10.78 
20% 25% 3.15 3.25 3.63 3.62 3.28 3.99 2.87 2.66 10.78 
30% 43% 3.31 3.46 3.92 4.00 3.28 4.54 2.87 2.66 10.78 
40% 67% 3.41 3.53 4.10 4.17 3.28 8.61 2.87 2.66 10.78 
50% 100% 3.41 3.61 4.10 4.17 4.03 9.04 3.34 2.66 10.78 
60% 150% 5.77 3.83 4.34 4.39 4.59 9.61 3.55 3.35 10.78 
70% 233% 7.31 5.72 5.96 5.35 4.59 10.01 3.66 3.43 10.78 
80% 400% 7.63 8.42 7.90 6.16 4.84 10.32 3.86 3.65 10.78 
90% 900% 7.94 8.78 8.14 7.16 4.84 10.56 3.86 3.65 10.78 
Once the COE and COD value have been estimated, the WACC is calculated for each scenario. 
The full table of results is shown below. However, of interest is the minimum WACC estimated 













2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0% 0%  8.91   9.32   9.38   12.95   12.38   13.04   13.05   11.74   10.29  
10% 11%  8.65   9.06   9.12   12.60   12.08   12.73   12.74   11.49   11.19  
20% 25%  8.40   8.81   8.87   12.25   11.78   12.63   12.43   11.25   12.09  
30% 43%  8.20   8.62   8.70   12.01   11.48   12.60   12.12   11.00   12.98  
40% 67%  8.00   8.41   8.55   11.76   11.18   14.08   11.81   10.75   13.88  
50% 100%  7.78   8.22   8.34   11.47   11.26   14.58   11.73   10.51   14.78  
60% 150%  8.97   8.13   8.28   11.30   11.37   15.50   11.59   10.68   15.68  
70% 233%  10.06   9.27   9.23   11.71   11.20   16.42   11.43   10.56   16.58  
80% 400%  10.59   11.50   10.76   12.18   11.23   17.34   11.36   10.57   17.47  
90% 900%  11.21   12.24   11.24   12.98   11.09   18.26   11.15   10.42   18.37  
The minimum WACC and the corresponding optimal levels of debt are shown in the table below 
for each year analysed. As discussed previously, while it is important to determine the lowest 
WACC in any particular year, it is also important that the optimal WACC be found at a level 
which results in AAL recording an investment grade credit rating. As seen from the results 
depicted in the table below, none of the implied Moody’s credit ratings found for AAL in the 
analysis are below the Baa3 rating. All minimum WACC estimates are therefore found with 
corresponding investment grade implied ratings. It is therefore not necessary to adjust the results 
in order to account for non-investment grade ratings. In the case of the 2012 year, the negative 
EBIT recorded results in an implied credit rating of the lowest rating, namely D2. A D2 rating 
results in a debt being very costly. In addition, in 2012 AAL could derive no benefit from the tax 
shield. As a result, the optimal level of debt for AAL in 2012 is no debt at all, i.e. the lowest 
WACC is found to be equal to the COE. This is consistent with our comment that, in 2012, AAL 
could not afford to hold any debt at all as it did not derive sufficient operating profit (at the EBIT 
level) to service any debt.  
Table 16: Estimated optimal capital structure 
Optimal capital structure (%) 





 WACC 7.78 8.13 8.28 11.30 11.09 12.60 11.15 10.42 10.29 
Rating A3 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 A3 A3 A3 A3 Aaa 
D/(D+E) 50 80.00 60.00 60.00 90.00 30.00 90.00 90.00 0.00 
D/E 100 400.00 150.00 150.0 900.00 42.86 900.00 900.00 0.00 
The optimal capital structure for AAL is therefore found at the combinations of equity and debt 
where WACC is minimised in each of the years 2004 to 2012. The lowest implied WACC for the 
period reviewed is found in 2004 where the cost of capital is estimated to be lowest with equal 
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levels of equity and debt. The highest optimal WACC is found in 2009 at 12.60% at an optimal 
implied debt-to equity ratio of 42.86%. 
Conclusion 
Compared to the historical position of AAL, our findings suggest that AAL had a far greater 
capacity for debt during the period 2004 to 2012. Never did AAL’s historical debt-to-equity ratio 
exceed 50% during the period, while our analysis would suggest that apart from 2009, the optimal 
debt-to-capital ratio far exceeded this. In addition, except for 2012, moving to the estimated 
optimal debt-to-equity weightings would result in higher firm value due to a lower WACC. 
Table 17: Estimated optimal capital structure versus actual reported 
Optimal capital structure (%) 





 WACC 7.78 8.13 8.28 11.30 11.09 12.60 11.15 10.42 10.29 
D/(D+E) 50 80.00 60.00 60.00 90.00 30.00 90.00 90.00 0.00 





l WACC 7.66 8.72 9.30 12.88 11.03 12.87 13.00 11.58 9.72 
D/(D+E) 26.67 16.17 8.64 9.80 31.51 17.34 14.61 18.27 27.26 
D/E 36.38 19.30 9.46 10.87 46.01 20.97 17.11 22.35 37.47 
Compared to the actual capital structure calculations obtained for AAL, it does not appear that 
any particular capital structure was targeted by management. Furthermore, the share repurchase 
program did not result in a lasting target being achieved. We make this observation based on the 
fact that no similarity in actual capital structure results is observed for the years 2004 to 2012 for 
AAL. 
As discussed above, the share repurchase program undertaken by AAL did not add value to 
shareholders. Furthermore, the repurchase of shares does not appear to have been done with the 
intention to alter AAL’s capital structure to be in line with any particular target. In addition, in 
the years both before and after the share repurchase, the company was significantly under 
leveraged when considering the optimal scenarios estimated.  
The question therefore arises whether there may be other explanations which may shed light on 
why AAL adopted the capital structure which it did, and in particular, why is was so significantly 





5. Other Capital Structure considerations 
Even though a firm may have capacity for debt, it may not fully utilise this available debt. This 
may because management may choose to reserve funding capacity for the prospect of undertaking 
future investment opportunities that may arise. Highly leverage firms are more likely to not 
undertake profitable investments (Myers, 1977). High growth firms should therefore rather use 
greater proportions of equity finance. In the case of AAL, new projects require significant capital 
investment. Furthermore, such investments typically have long lead-times before generating 
operating income. It is argued that leverage is positively correlated with fixed assets, non-debt tax 
shield, investment opportunities and firm size while negatively correlated with volatility, risk of 
bankruptcy, profitability and product uniqueness (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Regarding assets, if a 
large proportion of a firm’s assets are tangible and fixed, then these assets could serve as security 
to a lender and therefore reduce the risk of default and agency costs and, in the case of default, 
such assets would be expected to retain their value. Therefore, higher reported tangible assets 
would be expected to result in higher leverage (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Rajan & Zingales (1995) 
discuss the correlation between firm size and leverage and state that “larger firms tend to be more 
diversified and fail less often, so size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy”. 
If this is the case, size would be expected to be positively correlated to leverage. The theory of 
the effect of profitability on leverage is somewhat less clear. Consistent with the pecking order 
theory, Myers & Majluf (1984) suggest a negative relationship, as profitable firms will first use 
internal funds for financing. However, Jensen (1986) suggests a positive relationship if firms are 
forced to commit to returning cash by increasing leverage.  
We follow the approach of Rajan & Zingales (1995) in investigating these above factors. They 
find that the measures fixed-asset-to-total-assets (what they term ‘tangibility) and firm size are 
both positively correlated to leverage. Furthermore, they find investment opportunities and 
profitability to be negatively correlated with leverage. Firm size is measured as the logarithm of 
net-sales. Investment opportunities are measured by the market-to-book value as a proxy. 
Profitability is measure as EBITDA over the book value of assets. 
We therefore used the approach of Rajan & Zingales (1995) and their measures used, to 
investigate whether the results of AAL provide similar findings. These four metrics discussed 




Table 18: AAL historical results 
AAL 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Tangibility 0.86 0.85 0.77 0.74 0.78 0.86 0.82 0.77 0.79 
Investment 
opportunities 1.14 1.45 1.99 2.26 1.16 1.55 1.48 1.09 0.99 
Firm size 4.42 4.47 4.40 4.41 4.42 4.32 4.45 4.49 4.46 
Profitability 10.70 14.78 20.84 22.16 20.08 10.79 18.25 15.75 0.98 
 
D/E (%) 36.38  19.30 9.46 10.87 46.01 20.97 17.11 22.35 37.47 
 
AAL’s reported leverage first decreased between 2004 and 2006. During this time, tangibility 
decreased, investment opportunities increased, firm size increased before decreasing and 
profitability increased. These results would seem to broadly match the correlation findings of 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) relating to leverage. 
During 2007 and 2008, AAL’s calculated leverage then increased, significantly in 2008.  During 
these two years, tangibility and firm size increase while investment opportunities and profitability 
both decreased. These movements match the correlation relationship found by Rajan & Zingales 
(1995). 
AAL’s leverage then decreased again in 2009 and 2010. During this period, only the movements 
in the tangibility and profitability measurements confirm the correlation relationships found. 
Lastly, AAL’s calculated leverage then increased again in 2011 and 2012. Tangibility decreased 
in 2011 before increasing in 2012. Both measured investment opportunities and profitability were 
lower in the 2011 and 2012. Firm size increased in 2011 before decreasing in 2012. The changes 
in the measures of investment opportunities and profitability therefore both match the correlation 
results of Rajan & Zingales (1995) whereas the findings for tangibility and firm size are mixed.  
6. Conclusion 
During 2006, AAL adopted and implemented its first share repurchase program, which continued 
up until its suspension in 2008. While management stated that share repurchases would only be 
done in the interest of shareholders, the repurchase program was disastrous for shareholder value. 
Management also stated that share repurchases provide the firm with flexibility regarding its 
capital structure. 
We investigated the capital structure of AAL for the years 2004 to 2012 from an optimal capital 
structure perspective. Using a CAPM approach, we find no evidence that AAL targeted or 
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implemented a capital structure, which could be considered optimal. In fact, no specific capital 
structure seems to have been targeted at all as no consistency in results is found, even after the 
share repurchase program. 
The optimal capital structure calculated suggests a greater portion of debt should have been 
adopted by AAL. Given that no information is provided as to a specific capital structure targeted 
by AAL, it is not clear whether the capital structure was actively managed, perhaps by share 
repurchases, during the period of review. However, based on the CAPM approach and optimal 
capital structure define as that which minimises WACC, the actual capital structure adopted by 
AAL was sub-optimal for all but three of the nine years reviewed. 
Due to the complex nature of capital structure design decisions, and in consideration of our 
optimal structure findings, we considered other empirical studies to try to better understand the 
reported capital structure of AAL witnessed. Using measures for fixed assets, firm size, 
investment opportunities and profitability, we investigated whether these additional 
characteristics of AAL, and their relationships to each other, might explain the observed capital 
structure of AAL. We find that the results of AAL do broadly agree with the empirical study of 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) who find leverage to be positively correlated to fixed-asset-to-total-
assets values and to firm size while being negatively correlated to investment opportunities and 
profitability. However, it is difficult to tell to what extent these measures influenced the design of 
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D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 4809 9617 14426 19234 24043 28851 33660 38468 43277 
Re-levered 
Beta 0.77 0.83 0.90 1.00 1.13 1.31 1.58 2.02 3.01 6.03 
           
EBIT 3612 3612 3612 3612 3612 3612 3612 3612 3612 3612 
Interest 
expense 0 213 433 681 936 1170 2377 3517 4019 4521 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 26.96 23.97 
           
Interest 
cover - 16.99 8.35 5.30 3.86 3.09 1.52 1.03 0.90 0.80 
Implied 
rating Aaa Aaa Aa2 A2 A3 A3 B2 Caa Caa Ca2 
Pre-tax cost 
of debt (%) 4.42 4.42 4.50 4.72 4.86 4.86 8.24 10.45 10.45 10.45 
           
Cost of 
Equity (%) 8.91 9.27 9.72 10.30 11.07 12.15 13.77 16.48 22.45 40.63 
After tax 
cost of debt 
(%) 
3.09 3.09 3.15 3.31 3.41 3.41 5.77 7.31 7.63 7.94 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 8.91 8.34 7.77 7.21 6.64 6.08 5.51 4.94 4.49 4.06 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.31 0.63 0.99 1.36 1.70 3.46 5.12 6.10 7.15 
           









D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 6061 12123 18184 24246 30307 36369 42430 48492 54553 
Re-levered 
Beta 0.83 0.90 0.98 1.08 1.22 1.42 1.71 2.20 3.24 6.47 
           
EBIT 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 
Interest 
expense 0 281 563 900 1221 1563 1988 3470 5669 6378 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 27.98 24.87 
           
Interest cover - 18.79 9.39 5.88 4.33 3.38 2.66 1.52 0.93 0.83 
Implied rating Aaa Aaa Aaa A1 A2 A3 Baa2 B2 Caa Caa 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.95 5.04 5.16 5.47 8.18 11.69 11.69 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 9.32 9.71 10.20 10.82 11.66 12.84 14.59 17.53 23.80 43.31 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.46 3.53 3.61 3.83 5.72 8.42 8.78 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 9.32 8.74 8.16 7.58 7.00 6.42 5.84 5.26 4.76 4.33 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.33 0.65 1.04 1.41 1.81 2.30 4.01 6.74 7.90 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 8764 17528 26291 35055 43819 52583 61346 70110 78874 
Re-levered 
Beta 0.76 0.82 0.89 0.99 1.11 1.29 1.56 2.00 2.89 5.69 
           
EBIT 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 
Interest 
expense 0 454 909 1474 2054 2568 3258 5220 7914 8903 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 27.88 
           
Interest cover - 18.21 9.11 5.61 4.03 3.22 2.54 1.59 1.05 0.93 
Implied rating Aaa Aaa Aaa A1 A3 A3 Baa2 B2 Caa Caa 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.61 5.86 5.86 6.20 8.51 11.29 11.29 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 9.38 9.73 10.18 10.75 11.52 12.59 14.19 16.86 22.21 39.13 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.92 4.10 4.10 4.34 5.96 7.90 8.14 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 9.38 8.76 8.14 7.53 6.91 6.29 5.68 5.06 4.44 3.91 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.36 0.73 1.18 1.64 2.05 2.60 4.17 6.32 7.33 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 8951 17903 26854 35805 44757 53708 62659 71611 80562 
Re-levered 
Beta 1.38 1.49 1.62 1.79 2.02 2.34 2.83 3.63 5.24 10.06 
           
EBIT 8522 8522 8522 8522 8522 8522 8522 8522 8522 8522 
Interest 
expense 0 463 925 1533 2131 2664 3367 4792 6305 8242 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
           
Interest cover - 18.42 9.21 5.56 4.00 3.20 2.53 1.78 1.35 1.03 
Implied rating Aaa Aaa Aaa A1 A3 A3 Baa2 B1 B3 Caa 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.71 5.95 5.95 6.27 7.65 8.80 10.23 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 12.95 13.60 14.40 15.44 16.83 18.77 21.68 26.53 36.23 65.33 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 3.62 3.62 3.62 4.00 4.17 4.17 4.39 5.35 6.16 7.16 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 12.95 12.24 11.52 10.81 10.10 9.38 8.67 7.96 7.25 6.53 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.36 0.72 1.20 1.67 2.08 2.63 3.75 4.93 6.45 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 4331 8662 12994 17325 21656 25987 30318 34650 38981 
Re-levered 
Beta 1.45 1.56 1.70 1.88 2.12 2.46 2.96 3.81 5.49 10.55 
           
EBIT 8477 8477 8477 8477 8477 8477 8477 8477 8477 8477 
Interest 
expense 0 203 405 608 811 1247 1706 1990 2395 2695 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
           
Interest cover - 41.83 20.92 13.94 10.46 6.80 4.97 4.26 3.54 3.15 
Implied rating Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa2 A2 A2 A3 A3 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 4.68 4.68 4.68 4.68 4.68 5.76 6.56 6.56 6.91 6.91 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 12.38 13.06 13.91 15.00 16.45 18.48 21.54 26.62 36.79 67.31 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 4.03 4.59 4.59 4.84 4.84 
           
wEQUITY (%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 12.38 11.75 11.13 10.50 9.87 9.24 8.61 7.99 7.36 6.73 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.33 0.66 0.98 1.31 2.02 2.76 3.22 3.87 4.36 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 7112 14224 21336 28448 35560 42672 49783 56895 64007 
Re-levered 
Beta 1.62 1.75 1.91 2.12 2.40 2.80 3.49 4.66 6.99 13.98 
           
EBIT 4352 4352 4352 4352 4352 4352 4352 4352 4352 4352 
Interest 
expense 0 295 788 1344 3401 4432 5318 6204 7091 7977 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 27.50 22.91 19.64 17.19 15.28 
           
Interest cover - 14.73 5.52 3.24 1.28 0.98 0.82 0.70 0.61 0.55 
Implied rating Aaa Aaa A1 A3 B3 Caa Caa Ca2 C2 C2 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 4.15 4.15 5.54 6.30 11.96 12.46 12.46 12.46 12.46 12.46 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 13.04 13.82 14.79 16.05 17.73 20.12 24.33 31.36 45.40 87.54 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 2.99 2.99 3.99 4.54 8.61 9.04 9.61 10.01 10.32 10.56 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 13.04 12.44 11.84 11.24 10.64 10.06 9.73 9.41 9.08 8.75 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.30 0.80 1.36 3.44 4.52 5.76 7.01 8.26 9.50 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 6150 12300 18450 24600 30750 36900 43050 49200 55350 
Re-levered 
Beta 1.63 1.76 1.92 2.13 2.41 2.80 3.39 4.37 6.33 12.19 
           
EBIT 10245 10245 10245 10245 10245 10245 10245 10245 10245 10245 
Interest 
expense 0 245 491 736 982 1428 1818 2191 2638 2968 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 
           
Interest cover - 41.73 20.87 13.91 10.43 7.17 5.63 4.68 3.88 3.45 
Implied 
rating Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa2 A1 A2 A3 A3 
Pre-tax cost 
of debt (%) 3.99 3.99 3.99 3.99 3.99 4.64 4.93 5.09 5.36 5.36 
           
Cost of 
Equity (%) 13.05 13.83 14.81 16.08 17.76 20.12 23.66 29.56 41.36 76.74 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 3.34 3.55 3.66 3.86 3.86 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 13.05 12.45 11.85 11.25 10.66 10.06 9.46 8.87 8.27 7.67 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.29 0.57 0.86 1.15 1.67 2.13 2.57 3.09 3.47 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 6062 12125 18187 24250 30312 36375 42437 48500 54562 
Re-levered 
Beta 1.48 1.61 1.76 1.96 2.22 2.58 3.13 4.05 5.88 11.37 
           
EBIT 9439 9439 9439 9439 9439 9439 9439 9439 9439 9439 
Interest 
expense 0 218 435 653 871 1088 1646 1967 2392 2691 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 
           
Interest cover - 43.36 21.68 14.45 10.84 8.67 5.74 4.80 3.95 3.51 
Implied rating Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa A1 A2 A3 A3 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 3.59 3.59 3.59 3.59 3.59 3.59 4.52 4.64 4.93 4.93 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 11.74 12.47 13.39 14.58 16.15 18.36 21.67 27.20 38.24 71.37 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 3.35 3.43 3.65 3.65 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 11.74 11.22 10.71 10.20 9.69 9.18 8.67 8.16 7.65 7.14 
WACD (%) 0.00 0.27 0.53 0.80 1.06 1.33 2.01 2.40 2.92 3.29 
           








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
D/E 0% 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900% 
Debt value 0 5944 11887 17831 23775 29719 35662 41606 47550 53493 
Re-levered 
Beta 1.41 1.56 1.76 2.01 2.35 2.82 3.52 4.69 7.04 14.08 
           
EBIT -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 -1600 
Interest 
expense 0 641 1282 1922 2563 3204 3845 4486 5126 5767 
           
Implied tax 
rate (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
Interest cover - -2.50 -1.25 -0.83 -0.62 -0.50 -0.42 -0.36 -0.31 -0.28 
Implied rating Aaa D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 
Pre-tax cost of 
debt (%) 2.57 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 
           
Cost of Equity 
(%) 10.29 11.23 12.41 13.93 15.95 18.78 23.02 30.10 44.24 86.68 
After tax cost 
of debt (%) 2.57 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 
           
wEQUITY 
(%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 
wDEBT (%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
           
WACE (%) 10.29 10.11 9.93 9.75 9.57 9.39 9.21 9.03 8.85 8.67 
WACD (%) 0.00 1.08 2.16 3.23 4.31 5.39 6.47 7.55 8.63 9.70 
           
WACC (%) 10.29 11.19 12.09 12.98 13.88 14.78 15.68 16.58 17.47 18.37 
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